A Life in the First Half-Century of Sociology:

Charles Ellwood and the Division of Sociology

The customary division of the history of American Sociology into the periods before and after 1945 is well grounded. In 1944, Charles Ellwood, one of the first Ph.D.s in sociology, and a former American Sociological Society President, published his bitter final message, his “Valedictory” (1944) which testified both to the changes in the discipline and to his loss of hope for it. He died in 1946 at 73. At the same time, a new generation was taking over American sociology, and taking it over at both an unprecedentedly young age and in what turned out to be almost unprecedented conditions of growth.

Ellwood disappeared from the collective consciousness of sociology very quickly under these circumstances, and the rapidity and completeness of Ellwood’s disappearance is grounds enough for interest. It is a sign of the extent to which the discipline changed, and a clue to what changed. But Ellwood is worth thinking about on his own, as a significant figure in the history of the discipline. He was the founder of two Ph. D. departments, at the University of Missouri and Duke University, and midwife to the founding of a third, at UCLA. He was President of the Institute Internationale de Sociologie, and leader of the critical 1935 International Congress of Sociology. He was also a public intellectual, whose books reached a wide audience and who was much in demand as a public speaker. Moreover, he was the author of one of the most successful textbooks in the history of sociology, Sociology and Modern Social Problems (1910), a book that created the field of social problems as a teaching area. To the extent that “influence” over the public comes from the classroom, one would imagine that this book had some influence on the many students who studied it, and indeed, its major thrust, to regard education as the only ultimately effective response to social problems, fits closely with the subsequent biases of the social policy enacted by the generation that was taught social problems with this text. Finally, he was a source, though to what extent is disputed, of symbolic interactionism, and the originator of the critique of mainstream American sociological methodology (Ellwood 1933b).

In what follows, my main concern will not be with his influence, or even with his ideas. My aim will be to recapture, through a consideration of Ellwood’s career, something about the
world of pre-1945 sociology and the larger world of publics, national and international, that he inhabited. Most of the themes I will take up are discussed in a more general way in other chapters—the relation of sociology to social work and social welfare, the phenomenon of the public intellectual, internationalism, and so forth. Ellwood is particularly revealing with respect to these subjects, not so much because he was typical, but because he shows the complexities behind the typifications. Many of the cliches about early sociology apply to him: grew up on a farm, was a scholarship boy at a state university, was motivated by specifically Christian social concerns and social problems, wrote textbooks, and did much of this in what Robert Friedichs (1970) called the prophetic mode, condemning social evils. But in other ways Ellwood belies the typifications, as will become evident. His career also reveals why a history of American sociology focused on Chicago, Columbia, and Harvard, and on the current canon, must be inadequate. The mundane world of academic sociology he inhabited was quite different, and so were the aspirations and opportunities of those who inhabited it. But his career is also important in illuminating one of the critical questions in the history of American sociology: how did the fundamental and persisting conflicts in American Sociology originate?

Reformism and the Origins of Academic Sociology

In 1884 the President of Cornell, Andrew White, sought to establish “a course of practical instruction calculated to prepare young men to discuss intelligently such important social questions as the best methods of dealing practically with pauperism, intemperance, crimes of various degrees and among persons of different ages, insanity, idiocy and the like” (“A History of Sociology at Cornell University,” Box 1, Folder 5, p.2, L. L. Bernard Papers, University of Chicago Library Special Collections). In 1886, Mr. Frank Sanborn, Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Charities and of the American Social Science Association, was appointed as a special lecturer for this purpose. The arrangement continued through 1889, and the course became the largest in the Department of History and Political Science. In 1892, after the course work in social science was rearranged, a full-time resident Professor was appointed: Walter F. Willcox, who had just written the first American statistical dissertation on a recognizably sociological topic, divorce, at Columbia under Richmond Mayo-Smith. E. A. Ross, then a new Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins, arrived at the same time, as an economist.

Ellwood arrived at Cornell as a student the same year. The idea of social science was not new to him. He had been exposed to the writings of Richard T. Ely, economist and “Christian Sociologist,” in high school through Ely’s writings for the Chautauqua movement (Box 2, Folder 2, L. L. Bernard Papers, University of Chicago Library Special Collections.). The atmosphere was heady. Cornell was enlivened by a strong interest in evolution that figured in various ways in the curriculum, and even in the outlook of the philosophy department, which was an American outpost of German neo-Kantianism. Ellwood organized a YMCA program on the family (motivated, it is supposed, by his own troubled family life3), that Samuel Dike (then secretary of the American League for the Protection of the Family) and many of the social science faculty at Cornell contributed to. Ross took a personal interest in Ellwood, and encouraged him to become a teacher of sociology, a field that barely existed as an academic subject. Ellwood did a senior thesis on sociology as a basis for a science of ethics under the political scientist Jeremiah Jenks,
and began to form, through his relations with his teachers, a sense of sociology, and a specific sense of his own tastes in sociology. He disliked Willcox’s ideas about a scientific sociology, which stressed the interpretation of official statistics which had been Mayo-Smith’s stock in trade, but he seized upon a remark that Willcox made to him to the effect that a psychological approach to sociology might be fruitful (“Sociological Life History of Charles Ellwood,” Box 2, Folder 2, L. L. Bernard Papers, University of Chicago Library Special Collections).

Each of these figures, Ely, Ross, and Willcox, was the product of a prominent element in reformism. Ely, a founder of the American Economic Association, had created a circle of “Christian Sociologists” that had included Albion Small. The breakup of this group represented one of the first divisions in sociology: between sociology understood as a movement of Christian Socialists and as an academic discipline, the understanding subsequently promoted by Small. Ross represented the trickle of “progressive” economists who eventually emigrated into sociology as economics became a conventional discipline by shedding its socialists and reformers. Willcox, Mayo-Smith’s most successful student, practiced a style of statistics rooted in the aim of the founders of the faculty of Politics and Economics at Columbia, to provide an educated class of civil servants for the United States on the European model, which was taken to require expertise in official statistics. This was part of a movement of governmental reform that had many offshoots and consequences, including the efficiency and municipal research bureau movements of the early decades of the 20th century (and eventually the professionalization of “Public Administration” in the 1930s).

Immediately after graduating from Cornell in 1896, Ellwood went to the University of Chicago for graduate work in sociology, with no scholarship (though he obtained one once the Ph.D. was in sight). Chicago is often depicted as a machine which transformed eager reformist students from their interests in such problems as broken marriages and delinquency to the idea of sociology as a theoretical discipline (e.g., Kaesler 1990: 13-14). Ellwood needed no converting: his thesis on sociology and ethics was already theoretical, and he came with definite, if ill-defined, ideas about what sociology should be, ideas that he developed during his career but never abandoned. The department of sociology was, of course tiny, consisting of Albion Small, W. I. Thomas, George Vincent, and Charles R. Henderson, and students took courses in related fields. He was especially impressed, he tells us in the autobiographical statement he wrote for L. L. Bernard, with Dewey and Mead (Box 2, Folder 2, L. L. Bernard Papers, University of Chicago Library Special Collections).

There was nothing parochial about the education Ellwood received at Chicago, nor about Ellwood’s tastes. As a student he published an article on LePlay’s method in the second volume of the American Journal of Sociology (1897), and spent the year in Berlin, in 1897, with Georg Simmel, for which he had been given an honorary traveling fellowship. He got little from Simmel, and found G. Schmoller and F. Paulsen more stimulating and receptive to the idea of social science as a basis of ethics. But his negative reaction to Simmel—whom he dismissed as a metaphysician of the social—was consequential, for it was in a paper he wrote in Germany in response to this experience that he formulated the basis of what was later to become his methodological critique of sociology (cf. Jensen 1946-47). When he returned to Chicago, he published his dissertation on the psychological basis of sociology in sections in the American Journal of Sociology (1899a, 1899b, 1899c). His Ph.D. committee, which included not only the
four sociology faculty members but also Dewey, Mead, and the economist T. Lawrence Laughlin, Veblen’s mentor, who brought Veblen to Chicago, passed him magna cum laude in June of 1899. His dissertation was an argument for a social psychological approach to the problem of understanding the foundations of social life, and for the idea of a psychological (or process) approach to the problem of the nature of society, an approach he later contrasted to the social contract and organic theories of society. The dissertation prefigured his life’s work as a sociological theorist.

What did this pioneering degree and immaculate pedigree get him in the burgeoning academic market of 1899? Not exactly nothing, but close to nothing. When he first went on the job market, his letter writers, including all the sociologists, Dewey, Mead, and President of the University William Rainey Harper, carefully avoided, with a few ambiguous exceptions, any mention that his degree was in sociology. Dewey suggested that he would be an excellent teacher of philosophy, and others suggested that he could teach in any of the social sciences, in a couple of cases burying the mention of sociology in a long list of other fields (e.g., Dewey March 25, 1899; Henderson March 30, 1899; Small March 30, 1899, Charles A. Ellwood Papers, Duke University Archives). Small, in a letter to President Lemuel H. Murlin of Baker University, does mention sociology, and the reference is curious: he says that Ellwood “studied sociology from the standpoint of the philosopher rather than the agitator” (Small to Murlin May 15, 1899, Charles A. Ellwood Papers, Duke University Archives). The language is almost certainly a reference to the Bemis affair of 1895 (Hofstadter and Metzger 1955; Boyer 2002: 3-4)), in which Bemis, an instructor in the extension division, was fired for a speech criticizing the railroads for “their open violations of the inter-state commerce law and their relations to corrupt legislatures and assessors testify to their part in this regard” Boyer 2002: 3). The remarks indicate how serious the consequences were for the fledgling program. These letters were written to no avail. In the end, Ellwood was saved from unemployment only by Henderson, who had heard of a position for a Charity Organization Society (COS) director in Lincoln, Nebraska. With it came the possibility of giving some courses at the University. The President of the local COS assured him that they would raise his salary of $800 for the year, and Ellwood, then twenty-seven, took the position. When he got there, he discovered that he has been snookered– the COS was defunct and broke, and he was obliged to spend much of his time raising his own salary, in addition to coming up with money to support the 350 families in his charge. Moreover, he found that any teaching he did for the university would be for free.

Ellwood nevertheless succeeded brilliantly. He gave public lectures on modern charity and the need for a scientific approach which were reprinted in the newspaper, and he raised money, leaving the COS with nearly $500 in the till at the end of the year. He also taught, without pay, two courses that other faculty had already organized, in sociology and social psychology (which were given to him by the creator of the course, Cornell trained philosopher A. Ross Hill, later his President at the University of Missouri, who was appointed as professor of psychology) and two others, one in “modern charities,” and the other in “criminology.” In the end the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska made him a regular instructor of sociology with the title Lecturer, with pay. But when an offer from the University of Missouri at $1500 a year and a full Professorial appointment arrived in the spring of 1900, he quickly accepted. The position, at least as understood by T. H. Jesse, the president of the University, was
continuous with the work he had done in Nebraska. Ellwood taught philanthropy, founded a COS in Columbia, and, as we shall see, did much more to fulfill the expectations that were placed upon him.

Ellwood’s experience of the job market tells us something important about the way sociology worked at the time, about the Chicago department, and about the dependence of sociology on the reform movement. Henderson is typically treated in department histories as a joke—pious, ministerial, boring, and a poor substitute for Jane Addams. In fact, as Ellwood’s experience shows, he was critical to the success of the department. Ellwood was talented and well-trained. He had fulsome letters of recommendation. But these didn’t open any doors. A letter from Jane Addams, a controversial figure, might have closed them more tightly.

Henderson, however, was another matter. He was a prominent, respected, gutsy and well-networked member of the philanthropic and reform world on which sociology depended, and his ministerial role and background allowed him to get away with serving as a public conscience. Nor was he a trivial person. In 1899 Henderson was 51, the oldest member of the department, at the peak of his influence. He was serving as President of the National Conference on Charities and Corrections, the major “social work” and social reform organization of the time, and was the author of a string of influential works on charities and reform activities. He was certainly the best known and most published member of the department faculty. When he negotiated his relationship with the department and university, he insisted on taking the job of University Chaplain—a position of influence on its own. Moreover, the Christian tradition of witnessing against evils together with his status as a minister and Christian gave him a degree of special protection that enabled him to speak out “as a Christian” and say things that otherwise would have been regarded as radical and “agitation.”

Chicago sociology, in short, needed Henderson far more than he needed Chicago sociology. And he did something for sociology as an ambassador for and proponent of sociology in the reform world in which he had established his reputation that was critical to the success of sociology simply by vocally endorsing and supporting it. This had been done before by reformers—Samuel W. Dike and others were promoters of the idea that social science as it applied to social problems should be a university subject. But Henderson went beyond this. In the entry on Henderson in Bliss’s Encyclopedia of Social Reform (1897: 570), the much reprinted bible of the movement, he is identified with the belief “in sociological science as an instrument of coordination of bodies of knowledge which in isolation would be sterile.” This is a specific form of the influential idea that inspired the Pittsburgh Survey and the “Survey Movement”—that serious reform required the sharing of information and effort among the various philanthropies and reform movements in a city (cf. Turner 1996). The reformers around the Survey, the dominant journal of reform, and notably its editor Paul Kellogg, believed that this coordinating role belonged to “Social Workers” (a category quite different and broader than the category it was to become in the 1920s) who were supposed to have special expertise relevant to coordination.

The dominant point of view among “Social Workers,” the generic term used to describe reform experts in this period, was that what was needed for successful reform was publicity and power, particularly power to regulate. But they also believed that social workers had no need of research or principles beyond what was already known. They thought they knew, for example,
what sort of food was healthy, and needed only to set and enforce standards. It is of course notorious that Jane Addams took neither notice of nor interest in the opinions of those whom Hull House served. The Pittsburgh Survey researchers were similarly insensitive. They railed against the way in which immigrant families resisted “Americanization” and would sacrifice to provide traditional ethnic clothing for the weddings of their children, for example, never grasping that many of these immigrants intended to back-migrate (and very often did) (Morawska 1996), and that this was simply rational behavior. The mentality of the hectoring nanny here is the same as the mentality that supported Prohibition, a favorite of the Social Workers of the pre-professional period which they often regarded as a cure-all.  

The claim that sociology had to make to justify itself ran in a different direction– toward the claim that more knowledge was needed– and Henderson was the most prominent member of the older reform movement who was willing to make this argument. Henderson’s idea of the special value of sociology in making sense of the connections between different social problems may seem to be so flimsy as to be undeserving of comment. But the idea is central to, and indeed realized in, Ellwood’s social problems textbook, which will be discussed in more detail below. Ellwood, moreover, treated Henderson with respect and responded to him in the classic fashion of academic clientelism, as someone Ellwood owed something to and who provided a relationship that Ellwood needed. When Henderson urgently requested that he write a chapter on the history of English poor relief, Ellwood put aside the theorizing that interested him and produced a substantial piece of scholarship for him (Public Relief and Private Charity in England 1903). Providing for translations of Simmel for the AJS, which he also did, was of course clientelism of the same sort, in this case fealty to Albion Small. But it was Henderson who exerted the greater pull, asking more and getting more.

The relationship of Chicago sociology to Henderson was a variation on a pattern found throughout sociology, which Ellwood himself would soon reproduce in his own department of sociology at Missouri. When Franklin H. Giddings began to travel from Bryn Mawr to Columbia University to teach sociology, it was the beginning of Columbia sociology as distinct from the statistics taught by Richmond Mayo Smith, a topic which had formed part of the original subject matter of the faculty of political science. But teaching principles of sociology was a minor part of what Columbia sociology originally did. Giddings’s students– in a program that was exclusively graduate– were overwhelmingly women who were concerned with social problems, typically destined for careers in charities. Giddings himself was appointed only because of the donations and bargaining of Seth Low, board member and social reformer.

The idea that sociology could have even gained a foothold in universities without the support of reformers or by ignoring them in favor of purity or an ideal of science is illusory. It was only in the 1920s, when the Rockefeller philanthropists, and particularly Beardsley Ruml, grasped that the reformers had overstated their knowledge of social problems and that regulation and power weren’t enough, that sociology received serious financial support. But it did so not as an alternative to reform, but as an alternative to the reformers, who were seen to have failed: in addition to the disaster of Prohibition there was the failure of the juvenile courts movement to live up to its promised impact on juvenile crime (cf. Sealander 1997), and the failure of the Pittsburgh Survey to produce any long-lasting effects (the reform mayor that it had brought into office was turned out when he ran for a second term). In the face of these failures, sociology and
the social sciences came to be regarded as a necessary intermediate step to successful reform. When the expected reformist results from their huge investment in the social sciences were not forthcoming, the Rockefeller investment was rethought, and in the early 1930s, drastically cut. But by this time sociology was established as an academic discipline.

Reform at Missouri

Ellwood’s early career shows how closely the expectations of reformers and the expectation that sociology would serve the cause of reform were bound up with the presence of sociology in the university. By 1900 Ellwood was called to Columbia, Missouri to the University of Missouri to establish a program in sociology; there was already a long prehistory of “sociology” at the university, indeed one of the longest in American universities. In 1872, Augustus W. Alexander, of the state’s Board of Guardians, had written a lengthy letter about the need for instruction in sociology which was motivated in part by concerns over what he called “social pathology,” but which also displayed considerable knowledge of Comte and Spencer (UW: 1/4/1 Box 2 FF 4A 1872, University of Missouri Archives). Spencer’s sociology was taught in a course given by the President of the University, Samuel Laws, in the 1886-7 academic year, in the Department of Metaphysics, which covered the social sciences and philosophy. And the Cornell philosopher Frank Thilly had taught an ethics course which was largely sociological in the years before Ellwood arrived (Box 1, Folder 5, L. L. Bernard Papers, University of Chicago Library Special Collections).

The mix between the reform and the academic was always present. But Ellwood knew that the position had been created in part as a result of the support of Mary Perry, a prominent Missouri reformer, and that this was support that needed to be repaid. This was the university President’s understanding as well. Shortly after he arrived, President Jesse gave Ellwood the task of studying the state’s Poor Houses and jails. His letter was straightforward: “I do not mean to divert you at all from other forms of work, but I never would have persuaded the curators to establish this chair except through the prospect of having this work done. Nothing would commend the chair so much to the people of Missouri” (Jesse to Ellwood December 2, 1902, Charles A. Ellwood Papers, Duke University Archives). Ellwood did the survey, and fulfilled a good many other requests of the same kind. The results of the survey proved to be highly controversial and were widely reported in Missouri newspapers and beyond. The study made him, briefly, into a national celebrity in reform circles, and he was invited to give a talk at the national conference of Charities and Corrections as a result.

This was precisely what was expected of him—outside the university and at the level of the president, at a time when the state university was under the most direct sort of scrutiny by state politicians. Letters from the Governor (typically, in Ellwood’s case, encouraging and supportive) arrived with some frequency. Yet Ellwood was very far from a willingness to be merely a social welfare researcher, and his academic peers also expected more—indeed his very presence in the job reflected the backstage efforts of Thilly and others on behalf of their very scholarly old Cornell friend. Ellwood’s own predilections and circumstance led to a set of compromises. He tried to give intellectual content to the problems that he was expected to deal with. And although he did the practical work both of research and networking that reformism and
charity work demanded, he was also eager to delegate it. By the middle of the teens, he had made the Columbia COS, for which he was responsible in a “volunteer” capacity, into a project that part time staff of the department could carry out with the help of university students. In the 1920s he withdrew completely from this work, to devote his effort to research and writing. But he created a department in which others could do the work, and the people he hired, such as Augustus Kuhlman, were very good at what they did, and became nationally respected leaders in social welfare work.

This was an example, in the microcosm of Columbia, Missouri, of a pattern that occurred in more complex and variegated forms in universities in the major cities. The connections in New York between Columbia University sociology and the COS were also intense, and Giddings himself served on the boards of settlement houses and so on. But just as with Henderson at Chicago, there was a need for a full time liaison to this world. Giddings, who had been compelled to do the liaison work himself, after a decade at Columbia, got two: first a social worker, Edward Thomas Devine, and shortly after, Samuel McCune Lindsay. Both were, as Henderson had been, leaders of important reform associations. Devine was General Secretary of the Charity Organization Society of New York, and Lindsay, a specialist on social legislation, was secretary of the National Child labor Committee, and for several years was president of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. It took Ellwood only five years to get someone to do this work for him; in 1905-6 he was able to employ the first additional faculty member in sociology, another Chicago product, T. J. Riley, for precisely the same purpose.

Establishing the Discipline in the University

Even though Ellwood found people to take up the burdens of training social workers, he never felt a conflict between sociology and reform. He was a leader in creating the Missouri chapter of the National Conference on Charities and Corrections, and as we will see, a founding figure of a school for training social workers. But he also made sociology into a successful academic discipline at Missouri. By the mid 1920s the department was expanding quickly, reporting enrollments of 3,000, and no longer dependent on its claim to serve social welfare.

By this time sociology as a whole was booming. In contrast to 1899, a strong academic market for sociologists had developed. Ellwood was a significant contributor to this market. The department had a strong record of graduating B.A.s and M.A.s who went on to prominent academic careers in sociology, among them Irene Tauber and Carle Zimmerman, who spent the bulk of their careers at Princeton and Harvard respectively, and three other B.A.s or M.A.s from this era also became presidents of the ASS: L. L. Bernard, Herbert Blumer, and E. B. Reuter. It was department practice, long after Ellwood left, to encourage graduate students to finish the Ph.D. elsewhere. But one of Ellwood’s few Missouri Ph.D. students, Carl Taylor, became an ASS President, and the Missouri department was ranked sixth in the first reputational ranking of graduate programs by field in 1925. It was also the highest ranked program in the university. The state of Missouri also ranked second nationally in the number of secondary school students taught sociology, reflecting Ellwood’s special interest in high school sociology.

How did Ellwood get the program to this level? Much of it depended on his own talent as a lecturer and his own personal qualities. It should be observed that quality of teaching,
something that tends to disappear in histories of sociology, is a theme of many of the biographical statements of the sociologists who came into the discipline in this period. L. L. Bernard, who was a student in 1903-4 and later a member of the department, described his experience in this way: “Ellwood proved not to be a radical and his teaching was clear as crystal. I have always felt he had a wonderful power of clarity. He was also personally charming and sympathetic” (“Sociological Life History of L. L. Bernard,” Bernard Papers, Box 15, File 8, p. 3, Pennsylvania State University Archives).

Growth depended on good teaching: the highly Germanic manner of Max Meyer, the brilliant but eccentric Professor of Psychology appointed at the same time as Ellwood, kept enrollments low and kept the psychology department from growing.

The way the curriculum developed was partly a matter of Ellwood’s preferences, but largely a matter of survival. Ellwood began with a list of courses that reflected both the expectations that he would supply training in charities’ work and provide scholarly content. But success in competing for students was certainly an important consideration. The major issue that Ellwood faced in attracting students was in finding courses beyond the introductory course that would draw students. The introductory course itself was always critical, and Ellwood kept the task of teaching the introductory course for himself. It proved to be a good means of recruiting. In 1901-2 he was drawing a respectable 62 students. But the second course was a problem. The next most popular course that was part of the normal curriculum was the course on ethnology, with 15 students, followed by American Charities, with 14. After his second year he wrote to the President expressing his concerns; writing that after he had chosen to restrict it to second year students the introductory class had become even smaller. The President was reassuring. He observed that it was to be expected that disciplines like history and mathematics would have greater demand. But it was clear that student demand would drive the development of the department, and that it was essential to attract students to more than the introductory course, and in a few years Ellwood had it up to 69, with only 3 freshman. The eventual shape of the curriculum was the result of a series of compromises driven by necessity, but also shaped by Ellwood’s own ideas about sociology, his interest in theory, and his belief in the importance of anthropology to sociology.

It is something of a puzzle, given the importance of reform motives and the demand for social workers, why the more practically minded sociologists did not simply take over the early discipline of sociology. Ellwood’s experience shows why. More emphasis on reform topics was not the solution to the problem of enrollment. With 14 students, the American Charities course was not popular enough to serve as a base on which much could be built, much less as the core of an undergraduate major. This meant that figures like Henderson were not in a position to seize control of departments, even if they were so inclined. Yet Ellwood never neglected the philanthropic base he was given to work with. As I have noted, he engaged the sociology students as workers in the Columbia COS, which he ran for many years, and in survey work in Columbia that applied the strategies of the “survey movement” generally (which Ellwood was a strong supporter of) and hired social work oriented faculty to teach field work and social welfare from 1905 on. This hiring reached a peak toward the end of his time at Missouri, in the late 1920s, after Ellwood himself had chosen, in the early 1920s, to withdraw from this kind of work as much as possible to pursue his own research and writing. His appointments in this area
included women and at least two scholars who went on to distinguished careers: A. F. Kuhlman, who had been attracted to sociology through working with the community survey (a common pattern that shows up elsewhere in sociology). He also appointed Carl Taylor, who wrote a dissertation under Ellwood that was one of the first books on the survey method and became an important rural sociologist (and one of the very few to become an ASS President).

Ellwood’s appeal went beyond being an excellent lecturer and the person responsible for education in philanthropic work. He was also a distinctive campus persona, a result of two special interests of his that were especially relevant to the intellectual life of students at the time: Christianity and evolution. Ellwood was a staunch evolutionist, both biologically and sociologically, though his use of the notion in sociology was anti-“Social Darwinist” and aligned with L. T. Hobhouse’s notion that social evolution needed to be understood as a learning process leading to social betterment through the evolution of a more rational, which meant more cooperative and altruistic, morality. Ellwood’s evolutionism was vivid and continuously expressed, leading him to become known on campus as “the monkey man.” One suspects that had Ellwood been a philosophical materialist and atheist, his views would not have had the same impact on students. But he was not: he was an outspoken Christian. And it is clear that part of the attraction to him and his courses grew out of this fact— as did some of the hostility and ridicule that he generated. The two were sides of the same coin. But it was a coin that was important for many students at the time.

Ellwood’s Christianity would be a good focus for a chapter of its own, and indeed one was written in the 1940s (Hughley 1948), at a time of theological upheaval. It is the aspect of Ellwood that is the most difficult, a century on, to reconstruct. Yet it is crucial to the story of Ellwood and to the role he played in developing departments in academic sociology. He was hired at Duke (a university founded with a specific Christian identity) in 1930 precisely for his prominence as a Christian sociologist, and the President, William Preston Few, justifiably regarded Ellwood as one of his best appointments, for he fit the task of representing the university as a safe place to send students. At Missouri, a state university, matters were different. Teaching Christianity itself was out of the question: that was left to a private school of religion operated across the street from the campus and a Christian junior college which operated across town. And there was constant suspicion among the faculty that Ellwood was teaching religion under the guise of sociology. This was an issue with a course in sociology of religion that he proposed in 1905.

Ellwood addressed this problem in a variety of ways in his career. In his early years at Missouri he taught a course, for credit, but apparently voluntarily and beyond his ordinary duties, on the Social Teachings of Jesus. Enrollments were so large, 28 in 1901, that Ellwood limited enrollment to 17 by 1905. What role these courses had in promoting sociology is not clear. Certainly they made Ellwood and therefore sociology more acceptable to Christian parents concerned about the consequences of college education, an issue of importance in this period and also later during Ellwood’s time at Duke. But there was a considerable overlap between religion and reform, and especially philanthropy, anyway. Most of the leading figures were religious in background and motivation, and tracts and disquisitions on the social mission of the church formed a significant part of the literature on reform. The “Social Gospel,” a heterogenous and increasingly incoherent movement, was part of the theological background justifying reform. So
the elective affinities between these aspects of the circumstances of early sociology would have
been important whether Ellwood had been a professing Christian or not.

Nevertheless, the effect of instruction in sociology under Ellwood, and later by other
faculty in the expanded department of the 1910s and 20s, was not to promote religion, or even
the anti-materialism (and later anti-behaviorism) to which Ellwood was committed. Indeed, in
the most prominent cases, Bernard and Taylor, it promoted the exact opposite: both were more
behaviorist and more materialist as a result of their education there. To be sure, there were many
other sources of these views in the university, not least in the psychology department, but
students seemed more likely to be stimulated to rethink their views by exposure to debate than to
be indoctrinated.

Sociology in the Departmental Ecology of the University

Some interpreters of the history of American sociology have stressed the role of competition and
differentiation in the early years of university sociology, and suggested that local circumstances
produced different solutions to the problem of finding a place for sociology. Charles Camic
(1995), for example, argues against those historians of sociology, such as Dorothy Ross (1991)
and Robert Bannister (1987), who have stressed the biographical origins of particular intellectual
commitments of the founding generation that were manifested in the forms their “sociology”
took, claiming that this focus has led them to overlook the local contexts of the shifting
definitions and boundaries of sociology as it developed in different departmental traditions.
These local academic relationships are difficult to disentangle, but the point is worth pursuing.
What Columbia, Harvard, and Chicago became, and remained, in some discernable degree, a
century later is still marked by these original circumstances. Missouri presents the same picture:
the local circumstances were different, as were the long term outcomes.

Ellwood was committed intellectually to the idea of a psychological conception of
society, as we have seen, from his undergraduate days. His dissertation was an application of
Dewey’s functional psychology to the problem of the nature of society. And his important first
theoretical book (Sociology and Its Psychological Aspects [1912]1915) was on this theme. In his
methodological writings he argued that the way for sociology to become scientific was not by, in
Chomsky’s phrase (1967), imitating the surface features of the natural sciences, but by
acquainting itself with biology and psychology and making its theories continuous with them.
This was a position at the opposite pole from Durkheim’s idea of the special and distinct
character of sociology as a science with an autonomous subject matter, and he resolutely
opposed this conception.

The local psychologist, Max Meyer, however, was not a Deweyan, but a proto-
behaviorist (and much more [cf. Esper 1967]). Meyer later commented that “I found it necessary
to combat the opinion held by some insiders, that is, faculty members, that ‘what Meyer taught
was not psychology at all, but some kind of materialism’” (Max Meyer Incident, Papers 1929-30,
1/0/1 Box 4, University of Missouri, Western Historical Manuscript Collection-Columbia). This
is a reference to Ellwood. But Ellwood’s students took Meyer’s courses (indeed, because of
Meyer’s relative unpopularity they were an important source of students for advanced classes in
psychology) and were deeply influenced by him. Both Blumer and Bernard, and even Taylor,
were converted to his views.\textsuperscript{18} Despite Ellwood’s hostility to this kind of psychology, there was a \textit{modus vivendi}, and Missouri sociology students were especially inclined to psychology.

Ellwood’s own closest connections, however, were to philosophy, and this produced another long term feature of the department: its commitment to theory. Thilly had been on the committee that had recommended the chair in sociology and an appointment for Meyer (initially in a department of philosophy and psychology, though the departments were soon separated). His connections with philosophy were important for Ellwood, as a source of scholarly standards and a model of respectability, as a source of political support in the university, and as an outlet for publication. One of his first papers, still available on the web, was “Aristotle as a Sociologist” (1902), and Ellwood published many articles in ethics journals presenting the sociological point of view. Ellwood was present, and gave one of the eight papers (on Tarde), at the founding meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, of which Thilly was president. This meeting is considered the originating event of the American Philosophical Association. Thilly soon left Missouri, first for Princeton, then for Cornell (where he became Dean and continued to keep a supportive eye on Ellwood, and in the 1920s attempted unsuccessfully to engineer his appointment). Among Ellwood’s other colleagues in philosophy in the first decade were A. O. Lovejoy, later to create the program in History of Ideas at Johns Hopkins, and George Sabine.\textsuperscript{19} Sabine was to produce the standard one volume history of political theory (\textit{A History of Political Theory} [1937]1973), the dominant text for decades; Thilly did the same in philosophy (\textit{A History of Philosophy} [1914]1957). The books, which consciously combined context and criticism (Leo Strauss denounced Sabine’s book as a history of error) were very similar in style and approach to Ellwood’s own \textit{A History of Social Philosophy} (1938).\textsuperscript{20}

Ellwood’s academic life after 1925 raises a new set of issues, which I will return to in a later section. But before leaving the period of “establishment” a few important topics need to be addressed. One is the problem of “schools of sociology.” When Ellwood began, and for the period up to 1925, Chicago and Columbia, and of course Yale, were distinct schools that shared the discipline of “sociology” as a kind of friendly condominium, without taking one another’s approaches very seriously (Yale continued this well into the 1930s). These departments did not hire from one another, but hired internally to the extent they hired at all. The very few exceptions, such as Robert Park, prove the rule: Park was in effect a home-grown product as well. There is a sense that a discipline is fundamentally an internal market in Ph.D.s with the same label, and the real test of having achieved a market is that major departments respect one another’s claims to legitimate representation, which implies the hiring of one another’s Ph.D.s (cf. Turner 2000). Sociology did not have such a market, in the top departments, until the late 1920s. Ellwood’s represented a kind of transition from this “schools” stage to the stage of a full market. He hired five Chicago Ph.D.s in the time he was at Missouri, and another at Duke (including his best hire, Edgar Thompson, made on the recommendation of Blumer). In this sense Missouri functioned as a Chicago dependency. But he was also one of the first major departments to hire a Columbia Ph.D., Maurice Parmelee, in 1910.

There is another aspect of the “schools” issue. Much has been written by Bernard about Ellwood’s lack of “tolerance” of views that conflicted with his own. This is a complex matter. It is clear that Ellwood’s hiring and expectations of loyalty, intellectually and personally, reflected the idea that his appointees ought to teach and follow his way of doing sociology, particularly his
psychological approach to society and his anti-materialism, and to some extent his Christian viewpoint. In fact, some did and some did not, and he had stormy relations with those who did not, notably Bernard himself, and also Parmalee, who later blamed Ellwood’s influence for his inability to get an appointment in sociology (Parmalee to Bernard, August 10, 1945, Bernard Papers, Box 36, File 11, Pennsylvania State University Archives). But Parmalee and Bernard had difficulty getting along with anyone, and in practice Ellwood tolerated those whose views and interests were different from his. He was particularly tolerant of personal criticism. Blumer’s M.A. Thesis, done under Ellwood’s supervision and approved by him, contains pages of criticism, some of it quite scathing, of Ellwood’s own work on revolutions, work of which Ellwood was especially proud (1922: 120-124). And Ellwood not only hired Blumer, he supported him and kept up a relationship with him until his death. Most of his students, such as Zimmerman and Taylor, were drawn to what he would have considered materialism and to an idea of objectivity that excluded the idea of scientific social betterment. But Ellwood did think of himself, as Giddings and Small did, of having a distinctive system of ideas that justified him in treating his department as a school, and never quite abandoned this idea, though he moderated it over time. In fact, it did not work: his appointments, like Bernard, and his students, such as Taylor, went their own way. But they were also marked by their experience with Ellwood.

Bernard was labeled as a theorist in his appointment at Minnesota, and in the thirties became a rebel against standard sociology; Blumer became an insider at Chicago, but he also became the most prominent critic of what was to become, in Andrew Abbott’s phrase, “variable centered sociology.”

Inventing “Social Problems” and Separating from “Social Work”

The literature available to “social workers” at the end of the 19th century was extraordinarily extensive. A series of the editions of the one volume *The Encyclopedia of Social Reform* (1897) contained articles with extensive biographies on every conceivable social problem as well as on such institutions as working man’s churches and the views of religious denominations on matters related to reform. The literature was not, however, an academic literature. Much of it consisted of official statistics, studies of social welfare schemes of other countries, and hortatory texts taking a stance against a problem or for a policy. Textbooks, and especially comprehensive, balanced, surveys, were harder to come by. The standard book for courses on philanthropy, under which such topics as pauperism and orphans were treated, was Amos Warner’s *American Charities* ([1894]1989), and this was still in use in Ellwood’s department in 1910, when he passed the course off to Parmalee.21

Ellwood not only produced the first social problems textbook, he did it very early. The first edition, *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*, appeared in 1910. Eventually this text, which underwent various title changes, was to sell more than 300,000 copies, an astonishing number given the relatively small size of the American college student population in the era in which it was a dominant text, and the fact that the standardized textbook market was as yet underdeveloped. A few words about this market and its evolution are necessary for us to contextualize this achievement and understand the most important difference between prewar sociology and the sociology that followed. One striking statistic should make this contrast clear. Before 1950 more than 80% of the ASA presidents had themselves written an introductory
textbook. Ellwood was among those who had not. Yet Ellwood was apparently the single most successful textbook author of them all. Howard Odum, Ellwood’s near neighbor for many years and himself a prolific author as well as an editor of an important series for a textbook publisher, repeated the claim that Ellwood had more than a million books in print worldwide. This was an exaggeration, but it points to the legendary stature of Ellwood’s achievements.

The trajectory of Ellwood’s social problems texts, however, deserves some special discussion. Warner’s *American Charities* ([1894]1989) was the only book of its kind. It was not merely a descriptive work. Its aim was to understand and explain the underlying principles under which relief had been given in the past, and was in this sense an analytic text, but what it analyzed were not the problems themselves but the means of dealing with them. Ellwood’s text covered some of the same material— the poor, dependent children, the feeble-minded, the insane, and so forth. But he did something much more radical, which amounted in its own way to a conceptual revolution in thinking about social problems. The basic idea of his social problem text was that social problems were interrelated, that monocausal explanations of social problems were defective, and that, as a consequence of the interrelations between the various social problems and the impossibility of manipulating the causes of social problems in the simplistic fashion favored by monocausal theorists, the only “solution” to the social problem in its full interrelations was “education.”

Education is a notion that has many meanings in Ellwood’s thought, but it is sufficiently central, and points to such a crucial strand in early American sociology, that it deserves some attention. One of Ellwood’s last writings, his *History of Social Philosophy* (1938), concluded with a discussion of Lester F. Ward and William Graham Sumner. Written during the Depression and the Roosevelt administration, it was an endorsement of the ideas of Ward over Sumner, meaning in particular the idea that intelligent social intervention was possible, contra Sumner. Ellwood took the idea of education to be Ward’s central idea and central to his sociology, and remained loyal to this idea, and to Ward, through his whole career. In public addresses about social problems, he returned repeatedly to the theme of education, touting education as the only and necessary approach to the solution of crucial social problems, even predicting that students would at some point be given far more extensive education than occurred under the current school system.

[He was especially impressed, he tells us in the autobiographical statement he wrote for L. L. Bernard, with Dewey and Mead (Box 2, Folder 2, L. L. Bernard Papers, University of Chicago Library Special Collections).]

Later critics, notably C. Wright Mills, whose meretricious “The Professional Ideology of the Social Pathologist” (1943) attacked Ellwood and others, saw this sort of reformism as namby-pamby and preferred a kind of Marxism, which he accused the “ideologists of social pathology” of having failed to consider. But Ellwood, who had personally sponsored the socialist club at the University of Missouri, had hired Maurice Parmalee, one of the most Red American Sociologists, and when he left replaced him with Max Handman, a Chicago Ph.D. who had done a dissertation on Marx, certainly knew what Marxism was about. He had himself published a major critique of Marx in the AJS, “Marx’s Economic Determinism in the Light of Modern Psychology” (1911), and included a lengthy discussion of Marxism, under the title of “Economic Interpretations of the Social Problem,” in the first edition of *Sociology and Modern Social*
Problems (1910). The Marxism discussion (1910: 340-50) takes nearly the entire chapter. To Ellwood, however, Marxism in the end was a monocausal, economistic explanation of the social problem which suffered from the usual defects of monocausal explanations. There was no lack of systemic thinking about social problems in Ellwood. Indeed, this was precisely the revolution which Ellwood’s textbook introduced. Social problems in Ellwood’s hands were societal problems, mutually reinforcing, insoluble by reformists’ nostrums, and approachable only by strategies that reflected their interrelation. Some of the interrelations were obvious, and the thesis lent itself to overstatement. The relationship between broken homes and juvenile delinquency, for example, which was a theme both of the textbook and of Ellwood’s public speaking, made his point about mutual reinforcement, but did so in a way that did not challenge the moralism of the reform element, and indeed traded on it.

But even this simple example is a useful indication of the contrast between Ellwood and the reformers. Merely providing playground equipment, or a place for the children of the poor to entertain themselves in settlement houses, or special juvenile courts, all of which were major reform initiatives of the time directed at juveniles, were not effective solutions to the problem of juvenile homelife and supervision represented by the fact of divorce. And no significant change in juvenile delinquency could reasonably be expected by any of these reforms. Nor indeed could the problem of divorce itself be made to go away without an assault on these systemic causes. This kind of reasoning about social problems, which appears repeatedly both in Ellwood’s social problems texts and his public lectures, returns these problems to their sources in particular aspects of the surrounding social life and society. And this in the end became the message of sociology to the social reform movement itself.

Where did this leave “social work”? Ellwood remained, as I have noted, continually involved in charity work until the 1920s. The Department of Sociology at Missouri did as well: as late as 1940 a specialist on social welfare was appointed to a faculty position, and in the late 1920s, at the end of Ellwood’s time there, there were several in the department. But Ellwood’s role in this work went far beyond this, to the point of being a founding figure of social work in the state of Missouri. His major effort was the creation of “The Missouri School of Social Economy: A Training School for Social Workers” in St. Louis. The School grew out of a series of lectures on social problems in 1906 “under the auspices of a local committee” (Box 14, File 7, Bernard Papers, Pennsylvania State University Archives). T. J. Riley, the Chicago Ph.D. who was Ellwood’s first hire, was made director of the School, and the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF) provided some start-up funds. Appointments to the School soon followed, and in 1909 the first class graduated. The School grew, and both casework and research were part of the training. In 1912 Riley left to become Secretary of the Brooklyn Bureau of Charities, and the School was without a head. At this point the local supporters of the school sought to make a connection with a local university, the private Washington University, which agreed to sponsor it, but only on the condition that it paid nothing. When the RSF money eventually dried up in 1916, the Board went back to the University of Missouri, which provided a small amount of support from the Extension fund. The School expanded rapidly during the war, providing Red Cross workers. After the war, it was quick to expand its casework teaching, psychiatric and psychological training, and training in public health. In 1923 it came to a bitter end. A legislator’s amendment to a crucial bill killed the School. The Brown School of Social Work was started almost
immediately by Washington University a year later, eventually becoming one of the top schools nationally.

This success story was for Ellwood a source of pride, but also of frustration. The ambitious social work program that he inaugurated, as the name of the school indicated, was concerned not just with casework, the inheritance of the COS, but focused on social legislation and larger issues of policy and on understanding social problems sociologically and through community research. This approach proved not to work very well with local charities, and the early graduates had difficulty getting employment in St. Louis, partly because the charities were dominated by local elites who preferred traditional COS style casework. What makes this failure ironic is that the Brown School of Social Work, which was the successor to this experiment which succeeded in appealing to the local charities, is, 75 years later, focused on the same kinds of matters of policy and research that the original school had concerned itself with.

Money, Factionalism, and Science: Sociology Divides

The issue of money is an intriguing theme within the history of sociology, not unrelated to some of its antagonisms as well as to the professional behavior of its members. The rise of foundation funding in the 1920s created a two-class system in sociology. Professors in the foundation-funded class were able to spend summers writing, and in the case of many of those involved with the Social Science Research Council, spend them in Vermont or New Hampshire near Dartmouth, where the SSRC supported lengthy summer meetings, a practice that continued for many years. Books that were not textbooks were ordinarily published by subsidy, either indirectly through the subsidization of the university press or directly by authors. Thorstein Veblen, for example, paid guarantees for all his books—only *The Theory of the Leisure Class* made back the guarantee. Foundation funding allowed for direct subsidies of books, as was the case with Parsons’ *The Structure of Social Action*, and also provided the wherewithal for university presses to publish social science on a subsidy basis for the faculty and Ph.D.s of the favored universities. Most of the classics of prewar social science, including *Middletown* (Lynd 1929), were published on a subsidy basis. Ellwood was never supported by Rockefeller money, and, even though he had a letter writing relationship with Raymond Fosdick, a powerful trustee of the Rockefeller philanthropies, he was a critic of the mafia-style coercive tactics of the quantitatively-oriented scientizers who dominated the SSRC. The issue of money combined with many other issues, generational and intellectual, that produced the beginnings of the bitter hostility that has marked sociology ever since.

These issues came to a head in 1928 over the Presidency of the ASS. Professional associations like the ASS rarely had contested elections for officers— the positions involved work, but were largely honorific, so the idea of proposing and defeating candidates was inappropriate and considered humiliating. It was not until the Vietnam war that the American Political Science Association had a contested election. Sociology had a similarly high degree of comity until the advent of the SSRC and the scientizers. Ellwood was, for example, on good terms with Giddings, who even wrote endorsements for his religious books, and indeed was friendly with many other people he did not particularly agree with. The next generation, including his own student, the chronically querulous L. L. Bernard, and W. F. Ogburn (with
whom Ellwood nevertheless had a polite relationship), was a different matter. They were eager to push the older generation out, and there was for the first time a strong incentive for collusion and mutual support: capturing the largesse of the SSRC and the Rockefeller philanthropies. The conflict came to a head with a floor challenge of the selection of Emory Bogardus for the Presidency, in favor of Ogburn. Ogburn was elected, charges of conspiracy were traded, and friendships suffered. Ogburn gave a famously truculent Presidential address that implicitly attacked the earlier generation in the form of praise for a very explicit and very narrow notion of objectivity. The bitterness was consolidated a few years later with the founding of the invitation-only Sociological Research Association, which still functions as an elite faction. Needless to say, Ellwood, whose collected essays criticizing the scientizers appeared in 1933 (Methods in Sociology), was excluded from this group.

Ellwood was, however, an exceptionally successful member of what was to become the hostile underclass of sociology. At the time, summer schools at universities were organized as, in effect, separate businesses, often with their own dean, and were opportunities both for universities to hire faculty from elsewhere and enable their graduate students to be exposed to these faculty, and also to generate some profit for the university. Students themselves often used the summer to take courses elsewhere with attractive summer locations. The University of Colorado Summer School became a successful institution, bringing in major teachers, and other universities were able to build up a substantial program of summer school which provided employment for professors from other universities. Ellwood was a major factor in the success of the Colorado Summer School, teaching there in 1911, ‘15, ‘17, ‘21, ‘22, ‘24. Virtually every other year he taught summer school as well, at Columbia, Wisconsin, the National Summer School in Logan Utah, Chicago, Colorado Agricultural College, USC, NYU, Harvard, Northwestern, and in 1939 at UCLA, where he had an important impact on the creation of the Department (and placed one of his most successful students, Duke graduate Leonard Broom). But this was success only relative to others who were normal teaching and writing academics, not relative to the beneficiaries of foundations. Professors taught because they needed the money, and money was an issue for Ellwood much of his career. Issues about salary were a source of friction between him and A. Ross Hill, the president of the University of Missouri, in the teens, and continued to be an issue for him in the 1920s. At some point in the mid 1920s, Ellwood was eager to leave the university, and when he eventually did, for Duke, his salary was given as the explanation.

The better paid faculty of the east, and those with foundation support (two categories that overlapped), as well as those from the richer state universities, such as Wisconsin, lived very differently. They did not teach in the summer, and were often supported. Robert Lynd was one of those who were paid well and able to enjoy the benefits of this system. George Lundberg returned to Vermont every summer (near SSRC supported summer meetings at Dartmouth) even when he was on the faculty at the University of Washington. This allowed for a great deal of hobnobbing with other like-minded sociologists, which was basic to the formation of a sociological elite. The pattern continued to the days of Lazarsfeld, who also enjoyed the benefits of this system. Relieved of the necessity of writing textbooks, able to publish research through subsidies, they occupied a world unlike the rest of American sociology.

Writing textbooks, like teaching in Summer Schools, had its rewards. Those who were
successful in the market did derive some income from it. Charles Horton Cooley, another nonmember of the scientizing faction, used the money to buy a car. Ellwood, who must have made much more, took up motoring as a hobby, especially late in life, and was able to finance sabbaticals in Europe for himself, which included a substantial amount of travel and personal contact with European sociologists. Nevertheless, until he went to Duke, Ellwood felt pinched. And the demands of survival were a great burden on those who were not in the foundation supported elite. Even Ellsworth Faris, who had five children, was compelled to teach in the summer school at the University of Chicago, and attributed his lack of productivity to this fact (Odum 1951: 183). So it is not surprising that great works of sociological thought were not routinely produced outside of the circle of the privileged, and that the attitudes of the excluded were flavored with resentment.

There was very little that corresponded to the present academic book market in the United States, and this fact produced another divide. As noted, the publication of research books was almost invariably subsidized, and only authors with foundation support or universities with active subsidy presses, such as Chicago, benefitted from this. Very few authors were able to write for the general book market, and writing for the public has its own constraints. Ellwood was a success within these constraints. He published for a general intellectual audience from the time of World War I. His first venture into this market was *The Social Problem: A Constructive Analysis* (1915), which was published by Macmillan in a series edited by Ely, a series following the general strategy of the Chautaqua texts that had introduced Ellwood to social science as a high school student. In 1922 he broke into another “public” market, publishing a book entitled *The Reconstruction of Religion*, that sold 7,000 copies in its first year. Ellwood’s successes in categories other than textbooks, with the exception of his *History of Social Philosophy*, were in the “religious” category. *The Reconstruction of Religion* was the biggest success, and the same themes figured in his two other “religious” books. Understanding them as books requires an understanding of Ellwood as a religious thinker and figure, which will be the topic of the next section. But it should be clear that writing for the public could not have been a living for Ellwood. Among sociologists, making a living as a writer was only possible for a machine for the production of texts like Harry Elmer Barnes, who produced volume after volume on history, sociology, penology and public issues, and newspaper column upon column (Goddard 1968).

The publishing categories into which Ellwood’s books fell are revealing of the constraints under which non-subsidy publishing operated. His textbooks reflected both his lectures and the development of his sociological thinking. Keeping them up to date compelled him to keep up with and respond to the current literature, and for someone like Ellwood, who was predominantly a theorist, it was a constant challenge to interpret new work and new developments in sociology in a way that he could make cohere with his basic outlook. Yet Ellwood was flexible, responded to changes in intellectual climate by modifying his own views, and attempted for the most part to provide an evenhanded statement of the issues. Much of this was forced upon him by the demands of the market, but it should not be underestimated how difficult the market was. The use of his social problems text, for example, was opposed by fundamentalist ministers for its partiality to evolution and opposed by the local Association for the Advancement of Colored People in Philadelphia for its depiction of blacks, though as he observed, not on the grounds of the falsity of anything said in the book (Ellwood to Hart, February 16, 1924, Charles A. Ellwood
Papers, Duke University Archives). Textbook writing, in short, also involved constraints, and
yet, as a means of articulating a comprehensive sociological outlook, it could hardly be bettered.

Ellwood’s Christianity

What did it mean for Ellwood to be “Christian”? In a practical sense, it meant that he was
acceptable to certain audiences, and had special access to others. It also meant that he was in a
group of persons with common interests in having a “Christian” viewpoint preserved against its
contraries, which for Ellwood meant philosophical materialism (or scientific naturalism) and
behaviorism (because of its denial of human purposiveness) and more generally of ethical
nihilism and the rejection of the idea of higher ethical demands. These were important issues in
the larger intellectual culture of the time, but also in the social sciences— the resolutely
secularizing progressive historian James Harvey Robinson was a case in point. These
commitments led him into various alliances. One was with Pitirim Sorokin, who both theorized
the problem of materialism and rejected it. Ellwood’s first contact with Sorokin came in 1923,
when Sorokin wrote him a fan letter about The Reconstruction of Religion, explaining his
situation as an exile and his desire to come to the United States: the letter began a long
relationship (Sorokin to Ellwood February 13, 1923, Charles A. Ellwood Papers, Duke
University Archives). But Christianity, as indicated earlier, played a role in academic politics as
well. Ellwood opposed appointments to academic positions, sometimes covertly by putting out
the word to sympathetic deans or chairs, for those whose sociological views he regarded as
unacceptably materialist or atheistic.

Despite this, Ellwood was far from being a sectarian or fundamentalist. Indeed, the whole
thrust of his “religious” writing was in the opposite direction, against both denominationalism
and a theological approach to Christianity, and in favor of accommodating Christianity to science
and social science. Writings of this kind often, in retrospect, are closer to the opposition than
they appear at the time, so it is important to see who the opponents were. Ellwood’s Christianity
was “liberal” and indeed about as extreme in its liberalism, in crucial respects, as could be. The
fundamentalists loathed him for his evolutionism. Even his Japanese translator, M. Anesaki, with
whom he had a particularly close and long term relationship, in one letter reproached him for
providing an account of Christianity in The Reconstruction of Religion that was completely
ethical, meaning that it ignored the whole problem of grace, salvation, the divine, and so forth
(Anesaki to Ellwood, September 12, 1922, Charles A. Ellwood Papers, Duke University
Archives). This was an accurate criticism. When Ellwood called for the reconstruction of
religion in the light of social science, he meant to strip the Christian message of the whole
machinery of Protestant theology, which he criticized as divisive and a distraction from the core
Christian message, and offensive to the non-Christians with whom co-operation was necessary
(cf. 1922: 159). And what was this core message? As usual, Ellwood is crystal clear:

The solution which positive Christianity proposes of the religious problem of our time . . .
is simple. Let the religious leaders of our day grasp the full social significance of religion,
drop their theological disputations, give religion the positive humanitarian trend which
civilization demands, recognize that their essential work is the maintenance and
propagation of rational social values, and teach clearly, as Jesus did, that the only
possible service of God must consist in the service of men regardless of their race, class, or condition. Let also the recognized basis of religious fellowship become full consecration to the service of mankind (1922, 159).

The echo of Comte is wholly intentional. The lesson of sociology, Comte taught, was the fact of our mutual dependence; for Ellwood, it is, as he titled it in his next religious book, _Man’s Social Destiny_, a destiny epitomized in the fact that

> the collective life of men which we call society . . . is carried on by the continual exchange of services between men. It is by mutual service that men live. It is this reciprocity of service that is the basis of all human institutions and all civilization. The more intense the change of services, the more social values are produced and the more social life is built up; and the more equal the exchange is, the more satisfying and harmonious is the social life. (1922: 163)

This was, as Ellwood stressed, a frankly anthropocentric conception of religion, and this is the “social religion” of Jesus himself (1922: 162). His last religious book, _The World’s Need of Christ_ (1940) was squarely in the religious tradition that stressed the imitation of Christ as a guide to life, and eliminated the rest of Christian dogma. As he put it in a letter in 1944, “Christians, you know, are of two sorts: those who worship Jesus and those who follow him. I find in Gandhi a follower of Jesus, and I am more closely in sympathy with Gandhi than I am with some of my so-called fellow Christians” (Ellwood to Motwani January 5, 1944, Charles A. Ellwood Papers, Duke University Archives).

Earlier I noted the fact that Henderson was empowered by his ministerial status to raise moral concerns that would have seemed political or ideological if raised by others. Ellwood, by not only identifying himself as a Christian but by being outspoken against various local evils, had a similar protected status. This came at a price: according to Bernard in his memoir of Ellwood (Bannister, 1988?), many of his colleagues at Missouri thought he was a pious fraud, and were irritated by him, and some of the students made fun of him. As Bernard tells it, the citizens of Columbia disliked him as well (in part for his support of the local Presbyterian minister), and claims that he was often forced to backtrack on his charges. But Bernard omits critical events that were part of the story in which Ellwood stood out as a courageous and influential leader.

The first and most important of these involved a lynching that occurred in 1923 on the edge of campus resulting from an assault on the daughter of a faculty member. The event was seared into the consciousness of the local Black community and has been an issue in race relations in Columbia ever since. The lynching was presided over by several important community leaders; the victim was pulled from the jail by a crowd recruited in part in an organized manner from the rural area around Columbia (presumably through the active Ku Klux Klan presence). Shortly after the event

> a student followed Ellwood to his office to ask a question: Do you mean to say that a community in which a lynching occurs has lower moral ideals than the rest of the country?” Ellwood framed his response carefully, but the short answer was “yes.” The “student” as it turned out, was a reporter for the St. Louis _Star_, which splashed the
professor’s condemnation of Columbia at the top of its front page. (Hunt 2004: 142)

A local newspaper publisher, a graduate and enemy of the university, took offense at this and turned the remark into a cause celebre, attempting to get Ellwood to recant. Ellwood refused, and was supported in the pulpit of local churches, and beyond, as the lynching was denounced by the national press. Enlightened opinion supported Elwood: the Governor of Missouri Arthur M. Hyde, for example, wrote him to say “I am glad you are teaching such sturdy Americanism in your class” (Hyde to Ellwood May 7, 1923, Charles A. Ellwood Papers, Duke University Archives). But many more, especially in town, resented his remarks, or were irritated by them, and from this point Ellwood’s relation to the university began to sour. 33

For Ellwood, at least, his speaking out was continuous with his duty as a Christian. He left the Presbyterian Church, and was never again a particularly active churchman. His religious writings after this event are less optimistic about the Church as presently constituted as an agency of civilization. Indeed, as he said in one of his speeches, reported in the press, the lynch mobs were organized by churchmen (Charles Ellwood Scrapbook, University of Chicago Library Special Collections). Ellwood’s reaction to Barth and Niebuhr is understandable in light of his own experiences. Barth’s anti-liberal “Christology,” which swept the mainstream churches, was a flight from Christ as an example; Niebuhr’s insistence on the sinful nature of man, and his use of this to justify, indeed oblige, Christians to act violently against evil, would have for Ellwood represented the politics of the Grand Inquisitor. Christ, for Ellwood, was found in Dostoyevsky’s Alyosha. He was acutely aware that “evil” was a concept that could be just as easily employed by lynch mobs, and his own experience with churches led him to see them as obstacles to Christianity. Yet despite his alienation from churches, at Duke Ellwood continued to witness, movingly, for his kind of Christianity to students, who were in turn impressed by him.

Ellwood’s writings for his religious audience in the 1920s were sufficiently well received that he was invited to give many lectures and, at Yale and Vanderbilt, to deliver prominent endowed lecture series, and he was taken seriously enough in this domain to be offered a professorship at the Yale Divinity School. His student, L. L. Bernard, in his acid-drenched memoir of Ellwood (Bernard Papers, Pennsylvania State University Archives), claimed that the dean of the Yale Divinity School had gone to Columbia to personally offer Ellwood the position and when, upon being greeted at Ellwood’s door with the remark, “The mountain has finally come to Mohammed,” rethought the matter and didn’t make the offer, and other versions of this story circulated in Columbia (Nelson 2003). Ellwood’s own correspondence indicates that the issue was more mundane: money. Ellwood wanted $6,000 in salary, and the Dean, who wanted Ellwood, was unable to get consensus on such an offer (Brown to Ellwood, May 19, 1922, Charles A. Ellwood Papers, Duke University Archives). Ellwood’s Duke appointment in 1930 allowed him the best of both worlds: a Christian setting in which his kind of Christianity was respected, and control of a department of sociology in which his form of sociology could be protected. 34

Yet Ellwood was a loser in the theological struggles of his time, and by the time of his last book, The World’s Need of Christ (1940), he was far from the mainstream. This requires some explanation, not least because of the profound effects on American religious culture and politics of the struggle he lost. In Ellwood’s time Protestantism was dividing over the question of
“fundamentals.” If one extended the reasoning of the liberal theologians of the 19th century one would reach a position like Ellwood’s, in which Jesus was a historical figure, Darwinism was acceptable, the Bible was not to be taken literally without interpretation, and the Christian message evolves into an ethical message in which the example of Jesus would be central, and the superstitious elements of Christianity, including the whole list of technical theological doctrines relating to salvation, such as grace, that Ellwood’s translator found lacking in Ellwood disappear. A long line of European, especially German, theology, pointed in this direction. In one sense this was a movement away from religious belief toward a kind of humanism which might as well have been secular. Yet there was nothing half-hearted about the spiritual force behind the idea of living like Jesus. Weber, who becomes relevant to this story, as we shall see shortly, took the followers of Tolstoy to be genuine examples of the ethical transformation that commitment to this ideal required. But Weber thought of these Christians as prime examples of an other-worldly orientation, that is to say people whose Kingdom was not of this world. Ellwood, however, like the Social Gospel thinkers who preceded him, was a liberal optimist—though with a long view of the problem of human progress—and was entirely this-worldly in his conception of Christianity and the significance of Jesus, whose sacrifice was for this-world. It was this optimism that was sorely tested by the War, and the war produced results, especially in Germany, that led to the discredit of theological liberalism and to a revolution in theology that swept aside the kind of thinking that Ellwood advanced.

German ministers and liberal theologians embraced the war, justified by a doctrine of Luther’s known as the Two Kingdoms. The idea of the Two Kingdoms reflects a phrase of Jesus that became central to Lutheran theology and the Lutheran world view, that “the world is given over to the devil.” If the world is indeed given over to the devil, the two kingdoms argument runs, human conduct in this world must be governed accordingly—by the left hand of God, which permits and indeed requires responding to evil with force. The usual idea of Christian conduct is reserved for relations between Christians, or the private sphere. There was no conflict between the two. Both Kingdoms were expressions of God’s love. If one felt a conflict between the two, one was simply in error about the boundaries between the application of one and the application of the other. Needless to say this was a doctrine that served German militarism nicely, as it both provided a religious justification for war as the response to evil and confined the imitation of Christ to the private world of believers. As a side note, it should be observed that this Lutheran doctrine was alien to Calvinism, which had a strong sense that the structures, including the political structures of the world, were a reflection of divine will, and thus that political authority itself rested on the intentions of the divinity, and that as a consequence revolution was justified if the people, motivated by the conscience which was the voice of God, willed the removal of bad authorities in accordance with God’s structuring of the world. The problem of the justification of political action was settled directly by appeal to the conscience. This Calvinist sense of the nature of political authority allows for and even encourages the idea of political reform in accordance with God’s larger purposes, and Ellwood, raised as a Presbyterian, was carrying out this logic in his own reformist thought.

Then came Karl Barth. Barth was, to theology, what Einstein was to physics or Heidegger was to philosophy—a profoundly transformative thinker. Ellwood was a student during the first world war, when he observed, with disgust, the eagerness with which Barth
joined the Social Democratic party, and embarked on a radical rethinking of the issue of God’s significance for human action, beginning with Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, the text that is the font of the theological complexity that Ellwood so carefully avoided. Barth understood himself as an enemy of 19th century German liberal theology, which he regarded as wrongly accommodating religion to science— Ellwood’s central idea, which he wished to extend to social science. The key to Barth’s thought was the re-establishment of the distance between us and God– a Calvinist theme– and the de-anthropomorphization of God. This was an attempt to immunize religious thought from the intrusions of science: God was, for Barth, so “other” that nothing but the word of God counted as evidence about God or as relevant to God. By “the word of God,” however, he meant the life of Jesus interpreted in terms of the doctrines of grace, justification by faith alone, and so forth. This was as radical, or more radical, than “fundamentalism,” and less democratic, since the word of God was, for Barth, accessible in practice only to professional theologians. Not surprisingly, his views came to serve as a kind of professional ideology of mainstream protestant ministers. Ethics, however, now became a problem. If God is radically other in Barth’s sense, God is also radically irrelevant to human conduct. This was exactly the kind of theologizing that Ellwood rejected.

Barth was a Lutheran who read Calvin only when appointed to a professorship that required him to teach the subject. Ellwood’s other nemesis was Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr had been raised in a denomination, the Prussian Union, that combined Lutheran and Calvinist teachings, and thus, like Barth, was well prepared intellectually for the ecumenical moment of Protestantism in the twenties. He was born in the United States, but in a German speaking community. Religion was, until World War One, still highly denominational, and this was especially true for the Lutheran Churches in the United States, which were still conducted in German or Scandinavian languages, and formed separate worlds. Niebuhr was close to the editor of *The Christian Century*, to which he was a prolific contributor, and which had earlier been a promoter of Ellwood, and was offered, and declined, the job at Yale that Ellwood had negotiated over. But Neibuhr was a very different thinker. He was to become famous for his violent attacks on liberal optimism about human nature and his articulation of a theological argument against the kind of Christian pacifism that Ellwood stood for, his liberal optimism about the future of society, and the idea that had animated the Social Gospel movement, the idea of the realization of the Kingdom of God on earth through human effort, associated especially with Walter Rauschenbusch. Niebuhr’s *Moral Man, Immoral Society* (1932), was in many ways the final blow against the Social Gospel tradition, and provided its own theologically inflected sociology. The title reflected the basic idea of Two Kingdoms theology, that moral man had no business bringing Christian ideals to bear on society. Niebuhr’s version of this argument was that “sin” was a central fact of society that precluded such optimism. As a result of the “immoral” character of society, “the dream of perpetual peace and brotherhood for human society is one that will never be fully realized,” he wrote in the first chapter, and went on to say that society is “in a perpetual state of war” (Fox 1985, 140). He ridiculed thinkers like Dewey and decried the idea that “myths were superstitions rendered anachronistic by modern science” (Fox 1985: 165). These kinds of claims, his capacity for finding biblical backing for them, together with a prodigious talent for speech-making and sermonizing, soon placed Niebuhr in the position of moral authority in politics that was unrivaled in the United States, and allowed him not only to voice many concerns that politicians were unable to speak to, but to serve as the source of the
Christian approval of the war against the Nazis and later the Cold war. This version of the rejection of “Christian politics” was similar to Weber’s own, and this accounts for the odd historical fact that Weber’s (Jewish) follower Hans J. Morgenthau, the creator of the modern field of international relations, considered Niebuhr to be America’s greatest political philosopher, and became personally close to Niebuhr at the end of his life.

Was Ellwood’s religious thought a dead end? One observation about *The Reconstruction of Religion* should suffice to open some doubts. Ellwood spent a significant amount of the text on Nietzsche, whose proto-fascist power-worship was the main exemplar of Ellwood’s concept of “paganism,” which he understood to be the main enemy of reconstructed religion (1922, 96-98). Reconstructed religion was, as Ellwood understood it, in the enlightenment tradition. His discussion of reconstructed religion, with it emphasis on discussion rather than coercion and preaching, and its aim of creating a space of enlightened and intelligent international public opinion to resist fundamentalism and paganism, points ahead to Habermas, who had his own theological moment. Ellwood’s insistence that there was no theological solution to the moral problems of politics points to Michael Walzer’s suggestion that keeping the sense of irreducible moral conflict alive is better than intellectualizing solutions. The fact that the question “What would Jesus do?” later became a slogan of fundamentalists (who in Ellwood’s time were more inclined to use the Bible to search for interdictions) points to its enduring significance, and suggests that the attempts of thinkers like Barth and Niebuhr to bury it under theological arcana was a failure. Nor, of course, was the attempt of mainstream theology to evade the challenge of science by immunizing it a success.

Ellwood’s Last Decades: Public Intellectual and Internationalist

Ellwood’s major intellectual turning point came in 1914 when he was on sabbatical in England and became more impressed than ever with the importance of culture. The lynching was his major turning point as a public figure and religious thinker. In 1924, he was American Sociological Society (ASS) President. Increasingly he found himself on the losing side of controversies, first over instinct theory, second on the term “social psychology,” which he had used to describe his work on the psychological foundations of society, but which from about 1925 on had been invaded by psychologists armed with the notion of attitude as a measurable psychological entity. He responded to these changes by identifying himself as a theorist, by stressing evolution and culture, and by taking a longer view of the issues which excited his younger contemporaries. He was not alone. Some of the best minds of this generation, such as Alexander Goldenweiser, shared his views, and his alliance with Sorokin and Robert M. MacIver on this and on methodological questions, deepened.

Ellwood had been an internationalist from the start. His time in Berlin, his sabbatical in England, and an active correspondence with European scholars (as well as friends) led to his recruitment to the International Institute of Sociology. As the most translated American sociologist of the period before World War II, he was not only well known in Europe and Japan, but had close relations with his translators, who were also enthusiasts for his work— though often also acute critics and correspondents. The translator of his books into German, Bela Frank, who lived in Vienna, was a Mason, and initiated Ellwood.

The Masonic connection provided a new public. But it also placed Ellwood in a position of intimate knowledge of European affairs from the point of view of the hunted. Because of
Ellwood’s eminence, he was quickly moved up the ranks of Masonry, and became a member of the international Masonic council in Paris in the 1930s, precisely at the time that European Masonry was being threatened both by the Catholic Church and the Nazis, for whom the phrase “Masonic-Jewish conspiracy” was standard invective.  

In 1928, Ellwood spent much of his sabbatical in Italy. He became a strong opponent of fascism—long before the so-called “premature anti-fascists”—whose prematurity was simply a result of following the party line—and used many occasions to warn of the fascist threat to democracy. He was in contact with, and aided, the Italian anti-fascist opposition in getting their message out in the United States. The audience was uncomprehending and uninterested. But Ellwood was relentless. He was able to use his public speeches and interviews on other topics to deliver his warnings. During Ellwood’s time teaching summer school at Northwestern in 1936, a reporter sought him out for a discussion of suburban living: he got an earful on fascism and the European situation instead.

Despite his grasp of the centrality of the conflict between Nietzscheanism and Enlightenment values, which informed his perspective on these issues, Ellwood’s analyses of fascism were hardly memorable. He tended to regard the falling away from a religious spirit, Paganism, materialism, and the like as critical, and as one of his religious critics later pointed out, seemed to lack the imagination to see the world from the point of view of Fascism or Communism and thereby to understand them (Hughley 1948). Nor did he have a solution, as Niebuhr did, in a Christian viewpoint that justified real war against fascism. From 1920, he was an opponent of conscription and viewed large standing armies as a cause of war. He was an increasingly vocal opponent in the 1930s, arguing that the unique geographical situation of America allowed it to be defended by a small Army. His pacifism, which he hung on to very far into the deterioration of the world situation that led to the American entry into World War II, alienated him from his colleagues at Duke. He continued his opposition to conscription and to the militarization of the universities once the war began.

One can certainly fault Ellwood for the limitations of his outlook. His viewpoint was that of a democrat who believed that Christian idealism was necessary in social life and essential to progress. For him, the loss of the spiritual to materialism was the great and causative tragedy of the 20th century. But before being too dismissive of these now quaint ideas, one should consider the extent to which they were the glue of the internationalism of the time. The basic point of contact of Americans with the third world, as well as with China, came through missionaries, and the only serious voices for peace in the interwar years, serious in the sense of having a capacity to mobilize people across borders and in significant numbers came from Christianity. Ellwood’s diagnosis of the degenerating world situation was that world Christianity had not been strong enough to hold these forces back—and this was a failure that he did understand, because it was a theme of his discussions with his translators in Japan and Europe. That the Christian consensus proved to be too weak was a world tragedy. But there is also a sense that it was the only significant opportunity for a popular rejection of fascism. Ellwood’s contemporaries did not do much better. Prior to 1940, sociologists did a poor job of analyzing fascism, and the peace-keeping efforts promoted by such admired thinkers as John Dewey and the Outlawry of War movement were even less effective. Several prominent American sociologists, notably George Lundberg, pushed their stance of objectivity in the face of fascism so far that they were regarded widely as fascists themselves. Ellwood was an honorable and vocal, if anguished, exception.

Ellwood became the president of the International Institute of Sociology in 1934, the
second American to serve, the third to be elected. He organized the Brussels Congress of 1935. The fate and reputation of this organization requires some explanation. In the first place, one may ask, what sort of sociology did it represent? It had been founded in France by Rene Worms, for whom the Durkheimians, who were not practitioners of intellectual toleration, had nothing but contempt. Yet it became the only significant international sociological organization, and sought to become more— a federation of national sociological associations, as the ISA eventually became. Ellwood did his best to get the ASS to affiliate, as he had when he was ASS President, and tried to get the ASS to affiliate with the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Both times he was foiled by Chicago sociology. Albion Small objected to affiliation with the AAAS; the Chicago friends of the Durkheimians, who were hostile to the IIS, prevented the ASS from affiliating with the proposed federation of sociological associations. The collapse of international sociology in the 1930s followed.

Ellwood was himself fully engaged in the business of keeping international sociology going despite the drift into war, and in some ways he was the best representative of international sociology as it then existed. His interest in the problem of morality, for example, was part of the basis of his intense relationship with the long-serving secretary of the international organization, the successor to Worms, Swiss sociologist G. L. Duprat. Together they resisted the takeover of the organization by the well-organized Italians represented by the smart and aggressive Corrado Gini. In the end they failed. The refusal of many prominent Americans and the Durkheimians to participate created an imbalance that, combined with inherent weaknesses of the organization that had been inherited from Worms, plus a constitutional structure that required the rotation of the Presidency between countries, meant that the large Italian delegation had a right to be heard. Worms had given away memberships to various notables, and the dues structure of the organization, and its finances, were a shambles. Gini knew all this, and called for reform, an accounting of the finances, and the dismissal of Duprat. When Ellwood placed Sorokin in the Presidency as his successor, to stave off the Italian takeover, he proposed him as a Russian rather than an American, to avoid the constitutional problem. Gini then forced a compromise that would eventually lead him to power. As a result, after the war, the taint of fascism clung to the organization, and it was dominated by Italians for generations, rapidly declining in importance. The International Sociological Association, however, took over Duprat’s idea of federating national sociological associations as its own.

Ellwood’s Legacy

The elements of Ellwood’s conception of sociology fit seamlessly with one another and with his theoretical ideas. For him, sociology was a humanitarian science, working for the rational good (necessarily supplemented by a refined ethical religion). It worked through the diffusion of the results of sociology to the public, through what we would call public sociology, by serving as the intellectual basis of reform, and by the training of social workers. His conceptions of method emphasized the holistic community research approach of the Russell Sage foundation. The relevant notion of objectivity, for him, was non-partisanship, both with respect to political views or conceptions of reform. What made sociology scientific for him was substantive, not a matter of a special method: sociology was scientific to the extent that it could be based on, and articulate with, existing science. His theoretical conception of society as a psychological rather than an organic or contractual entity, and his idea that it progresses through a social process in
which mutual learning plays a large, and rationalizing, role, supported the idea that “education” in the broadest sense is the major element of social reform and progress. His argument that religion and ethics required reconstruction in the light of sociology and a basis in sociology supported the idea that it was possible, and necessary, to have a moral basis for reform. On the level of politics and international politics, this conception supported democracy and peace as the rational good. Perhaps Ellwood was the last sociologist for whom these elements fit together successfully. There is a sense in which sociology has ever since attempted without success to put the pieces, or some of the pieces, together again, and failed.

Ellwood was cursed with the ability to see the implications of new developments for his own positions, and for the idea of sociology as a science which informed social reform. He grasped immediately the consequences of behaviorism in psychology for the understanding of society, despite the fact that there were few texts articulating these consequences, and from 1918 developed a response, articulating for the first time the standard critique of conventional sociological methods. He understood that the attitude psychology of Gordon Allport destroyed the “sociological” social psychological notion of the group, and thus destroyed sociological social psychology, a realization later embodied in Blumer’s argument that symbolic interactionism was a field that replaced both psychology and sociology. He understood that the quantitative notions of science and objectivity that were promoted by sociologists like William Ogburn and funded by the SSRC, as he put it in the title of one paper, “Emasculated Sociology” (1933a). He grasped that the power of foundation money was great, and that the older model of sociology was doomed. But his greatest prescience was political. An ardent believer in democracy, he understood that fascism was a challenge to democracy and to the intellectual foundations of hope for democracy.

What became of Ellwood’s protests? Was he, as his own final statement (1944) suggests, one of history’s losers? It will suffice to say that the scientizers came and went and came again over and over through the rest of the century, but never fully managed to remold the discipline in their own image. The class system in sociology became more entrenched. In the world of the teachers of sociology, courses in Social Problems remained important, and student interest in sociology continued to be driven by social concerns, with sociology enrollments waxing and waning with these concerns. The large underclass of sociology, intermittently rebellious and sharing little with the elite, persisted, with many continuities in commitments and interests from the time of Ellwood. The discipline’s troubled return to the idea of public sociology shows how much was lost, and why it will not quickly return. Ellwood’s particular version of public sociology, like all public sociologies, depended on a receptive audience. His audience was the intellectually inclined Christian community. It shrank, and shrank nowhere more dramatically than in Europe, where it was swept away by fascism, the war, and the secularization of European society. It is an audience for sociology that has never been replaced. Nor did the problems of sociological practice disappear as a result of the methodological “advances” Elwood rejected. Ellwood is still with us.

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Notes


3. This issue is discussed in “The Social Philosophy of Charles Ellwood” (Whitaker 1972).

4. Richmond Mayo-Smith, an exponent of the tabular tradition of 19th century statistics, is discussed in Turner (1996). His papers are at the University of Chicago.

5. Ellwood’s relationship with Thomas was in many respects that of a rival: both were “social psychologists,” though at this point Thomas was known primarily for his study of social origins and his sociobiological speculations; his popularization of the concept of attitude was far in the future.

6. At this point in Simmel’s career, an accurate picture. Later Ellwood would arrange for the translation of some of Simmel’s work by his first Ph.D. student, William Elwange, for the AJS.

7. Ellwood is often regarded as a source of symbolic interactionism through his role as the teacher of Blumer. In one crucial respect this characterization is true: Ellwood (along with Charles Cooley) pioneered the argument that “society” is no more than a way of talking about a set of inter-linked psychological processes. For the mature Ellwood, most importantly, these were processes of mutual learning and adaptive learning, the content of which he identified with culture.

8. The position was replaced, when the Rockefeller Chapel was built, by the Dean of the Chapel,
who held the rank of Dean and participated in university decision-making at the Decanal level.

9. It gets ahead of our story, but it is not irrelevant, that the reformers defended prohibition to the end, and that there was an important epistemic or methodological dimension to this defense: they claimed to have a special kind of “social work knowledge” not vouchsafed to mere sociologists. The fallout over Prohibition was one reason for the bitterness of the split with sociology in the 1920s (cf. Turner 1996).

10. Done by his student (and minister) Elwang.

11. Undergraduate degrees had a large importance, both for Ellwood and his earliest students. Ellwood was helped by his Cornell connections, and maintained them all his life. In his first job, at Nebraska, it was a Cornell philosopher and psychologist, A. Ross Hill, who later became President of the University of Missouri and gave him the Social Psychology course.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that another Cornell contemporary, Frank Thilly, was a moving force behind the creation of a chair in Sociology, and behind Ellwood’s appointment. Ellwood also took a strong interest in the fate of his students. His relation to Irene Tauber was almost paternal. He encouraged her, recommended her to graduate school, and supported her career. She wrote to him regularly until his death. His relation to L. L. Bernard, which was tempestuous, was the most intense that either had with another sociologist. And he kept in touch with Paul Super, one of the first two students to take his courses, who made a career in the YMCA, ending his career as head of the wartime Polish YMCA.


13. Ellwood was not alone in this. One is struck, in reading the Bernard autobiographies, how often teaching, and particularly high quality lecturing, was a consideration in the development of interests in sociology that would lead to academic careers.

14. The notion itself was largely a retrospective invention of Richard Hofstader, himself a heavily ideological interpreter of American history in the Parsonian “consensus” mold (cf. Novick 1988).

15. One of his former students, R. L. Myers who became the superintendent of Dade County (Miami, Florida) schools in the 1920s, wrote to him recalling their conversations on the subject while a student, ruefully admitting that, resistant as he had been to Ellwood’s views at the time, he was now a convert (Myers to Ellwood, November 3, 1923, Bernard Papers, Duke University Archives).

16. In the prehistory of sociology, during the era just before and after the civil war, college curricula routinely finished with a course on moral philosophy that contained sociological elements. In the early part of the period it typically included Paley’s *A View of the Evidences of Christianity* (1803) as a textbook, and the intrusion of theological elements was common. In the history of sociology at Cornell given to Bernard, it is wryly observed that in one precursor course, Philosophy of History, “the Divinity bulked large in influence” among “the agents that control the causes and results of history” (Box 1, Folder 5, L. L. Bernard Papers, University of Chicago Library Special Collections).

17. It should be noted that some of Camic’s claims are misleading. At Columbia, for example, Giddings was not, as Camic argues, swept up in the craze for statistics as a result of the local circumstance of the power of the “economist” Mayo-Smith, whom he sought to emulate. The statistical tradition Mayo-Smith represented was part of the original design of the Graduate
Faculty of Political Science as “statistics” based on the Prussian state statistics model. Mayo-Smith was much less of an economist than Giddings himself: During his pre-academic career in journalism, Giddings (a former student of Civil Engineering) had played a prominent role in the Connecticut Valley Economics Association, one of the precursors to the American Economic Association, had published a classic economic article on Profit Sharing, had been fascinated with index numbers (a fascination that continues in his own extensive writings on measurement and in his student F. S. Chapin’s famous living room scale of social class) and had proposed index numbers for measuring inflation. Moreover, his first scientific publication, which was only partly statistical, was with the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics. What was more decisive for the development of statistics at Columbia were the exam and requirements system in this faculty, which required two minors. It was a system that encouraged sociologists to take statistics (indeed made it normal, and exposed them to some interesting and cutting edge thinkers, such as H. L. Moore and Franz Boas) and encouraged those in other fields to take sociology. R. E. Merriam, the pivotal figure in Rockefeller philanthropy, took a course from Giddings, for example, and it was possible for Columbia to have careers like Harry Elmer Barnes’s that combined history and sociology, or economics and sociology, as in Ogburn’s case.

18. There is a debate in symbolic interactionism about what Blumer got from Ellwood and Meyer. Blumer said that he learned scientific methodology from Meyer, but it is likely he learned much more: one of Meyer’s books, with the tell-tale title Psychology of the Other-One, An Introductory Text-Book of Psychology (1921) came out when Blumer was a student (cf. also Abnormal Psychology: "When the Other-One Astonishes Us" [1927]), raising the question of how much of “symbolic interactionism” he possessed before his encounter with Mead at the end of the 1920s. Moreover, Blumer’s conception of society and his later critique of the concept of attitude and of Thomas represent Ellwood’s similar, and strongly held, views.

19. Lovejoy (later to be a founder of the AAUP) was hired at Missouri after being ousted from Stanford for his religious views. Public universities were then still a refuge from persecution. Sabine had been a Cornell undergraduate (cf. note 10).

20. This book ends with the conflict between Ward and Sumner over the efficacy of social intervention, and contrasts very strongly with the canon of Marx, Weber and Durkheim that was established after 1945. Like the Thilly and Sabine texts, it includes many minor figures. Ellwood’s favorite is Turgot, who has vanished from the “sociological” canon, but for whom Ellwood makes a strong case.

21. As Parmalee later said: “I continued to use Warner’s book in spite of the fact that I could hardly stomach its vapid and artificial nature” (Parmalee to Sullenger April 17, 1945, Box 36, File 11, Bernard Papers, Pennsylvania State University Archives).

22. In his later, shorter, “public sociology” book The Social Problem: A Constructive Analysis (1919) the discussion is only a few pages within a larger chapter on “Economic Elements.”

23. The teachers in the School were almost all unmarried women, and more generally in the charities world much of the power was in the hands of strong-minded older women with money, who were customarily approached with deference and respect. The early records of the Russell Sage Foundation (itself of course dominated by Olivia Sage), are full of examples of this, especially in the memorials written on the death of board members that are in the RSF papers. As
the names of Ethel Dummer, Helen Calvert make clear, such women also had a great deal of
power over sociologists as well—at least until the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial
Foundation became the major funder of sociology in the 1920s.
24. An exception was W. I. Thomas, a consummate insider, whom he loathed.
25. Like others in the universities not favored by the foundations, they found themselves on the
outside of a system which provided huge benefits to those on the inside.
26. This pattern of factional, semi-secret, invitation-only organizations was not unique to
sociology. S.S. Stevens had a similar and in some ways even more militant (though smaller)
group in psychology.
27. It is said that the rise of Henry Kissinger began with his role in selecting faculty for the
Harvard summer school in the post-World War II period, during which time he had contact with
the best faculty of other universities.
28. Originally UCLA sociology was not only allied to but subordinated to anthropology,
reflecting Ellwood’s views on the importance of anthropology. Broom’s dissertation was on the
Cherokee, also reflecting Ellwood’s views.
29. Hill was a model for the university presidents lampooned by Thorstein Veblen in Higher
Learning in America (1918) as captains of erudition, the academic analogue to captains of
industry. Veblen, whom Hill saved by appointing him at Missouri, was a Yale Philosophy Ph.D,
who had been at Cornell studying Economics.
30. The case of Middletown (1929) is especially revealing of how this system worked. The book
was produced as a monograph for the Institute for Social and Religious Research, a personal
charity of John D. Rockefeller, Jr., and was originally anticipated to be subsidy published within
the monograph series of the institute. The directors of the institute disliked the book so much
they refused to publish it, and it appeared only through the intervention of friends and another
subsidy from another foundation.
31. Even this one sold in part to a religious public, and was a recommended book for the
“religious” book club, though not the main selection, as well as being “recommended” by the
Book of the Month Club itself.
32. The title alluded to Dewey’s Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), which provided an
elaborate explanation of the concept of reconstruction.
33. A related event, a year later, involved Herbert Blumer, then an instructor in the Department
of Sociology. Ellwood told the story from the point of view of the department: In January, 1925,
he made before a small group an informal talk on the negro problem which was reported in the
newspapers in a sensational way. A committee, known to be members of a secret organization,
attempted to compel the President and the Board to force the instructor (Mr. Blumer) to resign.
The university authorities refused to yield to this request, both faculty and Board courageously
supporting him and the department. The attempt recoiled on the organization which instigated it,
and since then the department has not been troubled by outside interference. (Charles Ellwood
“A History of the Department of Sociology in the University of Missouri,” Box 1, Folder 10, p.
32, L. L. Bernard Papers, University of Chicago Library Special Collections). As Blumer later
told this story, he was accosted by a group of toughs, Klansmen, near campus, whom he was able
34. The circumstances of this move are too complex to discuss here, but they coincided with an
event in the department of Sociology at Missouri that, although it involved Ellwood only
indirectly, and had a catastrophic effect on the university as a whole from which it never recovered. One of Ellwood’s Chicago hires, Herman DeGraff, had a class develop and distribute a questionnaire on attitudes toward gender relations, which was seized on by the same newspaper man who had opposed Ellwood earlier, to create a scandal by labeling it a sex questionnaire. The resulting furor had national coverage and led to the firing of Max Meyer, who had assisted by giving some envelopes, and several other faculty. The chaos created by these actions led in a year to the sacking of the President. But the damage was done, and the Depression prevented the university from recovering. Duke was the beneficiary, as other faculty moved there (Nelson 2003).

35. In the late 1930s, after Frank’s death, his wife escaped, sending her children to Denmark, and then emigrating with them to Colombia, with Ellwood’s help.